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In Godfrey Reggio and Ron Fricke's film Koyaanisqatsi
from 1983, the pace of life in the city is speeded up grad-
ually. Eventually, people move around too fast to be rec-
ognized as individuals and, as a result, patterns emerge
which are ordinarily invisible to the human eye. Individ-
ual human actions combine into an almost pathological
common scheme. When, at the end of the film, the cam-
era angle is elevated to a position high above the city, all
the activities going on below appear as hectic and incom-
prehensible as life on an anthill or, to use the films own
image, as circuits in a microchip. This is deeply fascinat-
ing, indeed, but at the same time somewhat scary due to
the dehumanisation of the actors moving around almost
like mindless ants, robots or electrons in a circuit.
Monitoring large-scale change can be fascinating for
similar reasons. We discover patterns and trends with life
cycles much longer than those of individual human be-
ings, driven by forces which are not necessarily apparent
to the actors themselves. All the small-scale incidents of
everyday life achieve new meanings when interpreted on
the background of long-term developments. This is ex-
tremely enlightening, to be sure, but, again, sometimes
rather daunting when the revealed patterns appear to be
overwhelming and inescapable. After all, we are part of it.
The subject of this paper is long-term  large-scale changes
in human society. I will do two things. Firstly, I shall give
a few examples of large-scale changes of utmost impor-
tance: population growth, appropriation of land and pri-
mary production, use of fossil fuels, and climate change.
This leads to a discussion of different ways of dealing
with large-scale issues: Aldo Leopold´s idea of mountain
thinking and neoclassical economy. In the end, I shall de-
fend a kind of attitude which has been named the Con-
centric Circle Theory and give a few suggestions about
where this may lead us.
Human population growth 
The human population has been growing almost continu-
ously ever since the first members of the species Homo
sapiens occurred some 150.000 years ago. Our species has
been extremely successful and has spread to almost every
corner of the world. This is an important point in itself.
What is truly significant, however, is the fact that the hu-
man population has grown extremely fast the latest couple
of centuries, i.e., during a period of time which, measured
by long-term standards, is very, very short (Figure 1). 
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Two centuries ago, there were less than 1 billion hu-
man beings in the world. One hundred years ago, there
were some 1.6 billion. Recently the 6 billion mark was
passed, and estimates predict that there will be at least 9
billion people on the globe within half a century. Stability
may not occur until there are 10 billion world inhabitants,
unless, of course, some catastrophic events have altered
the present pattern of growth.
This, again, is a key fact in itself. Another point, which
is worth noticing, however, is the fact that consumption
per capita in the developed countries has grown just as ex-
tensively as the global population. Between 1960 and
2000, while the world population doubled from 3 to 6 bil-
lion people, the global economy increased more than six-
fold, mainly due to economic growth in the industrialised
countries (MEA 2005). There is certainly no one-to-one
relationship between economic growth and growth in ma-
terial consumption. In general, goods are obtained in still
more efficient ways, and goods with less impact may be
preferred. However, so far, economic growth has been
closely associated with growth in material flow and con-
sumption. Even in the most developed countries, where
previous inputs have been accumulated into buildings,
roads, etc., the growing efficiency per unit produced has
been eaten up by a growing number of units (Azar et al.,
2002). If every world citizen in 2100 reaches the con-
sumption level of the upper sixth of world population liv-
ing in the developed world today, total consumption could
easily happen to be about ten times as large as today.
The sheer number of people does not in itself tell us
very much, though. Nor do figures of material and energy
flow, if these are looked upon out of context. If there is
“enough and as good” left, as John Locke (1966) – still
living in a world inhabited by less than one tenth of the
current population – recommended us to make provision
for in his famous proviso, population and consumption
growth can hardly be categorized as problems. If we only
inhabit a limited part of the globe, if there are plenty of re-
sources of all kinds left, or if science and technology can
be expected to continue to enhance the resource base
through permanent innovation, there is no reason to worry
about population growth. 
However, various kinds of indicators suggest that there
may not be enough and as good left, if the human popula-
tion continues to grow, and if the consumption patterns of
the developed countries spread to the rest of the world.
Within the latest couple of years, a number of reports have
compiled information from a variety of sources in order to
get an overall picture of the present situation for hu-
mankind, e.g., (EOLSS 2001; Steffen et al., 2005; UNEP,
2002 and 2005; MEA, 2005). In this paper, I shall confine
myself to a few of the most significant indicators, begin-
ning with the amount of net primary production (NPP, i.e.,
the total plant material generated through photosynthesis
minus respiration) consumed or otherwise appropriated
by humans, and the amount of land area occupied for hu-
man purposes.
Use of land and primary production 
The most cited estimate of the human uses of NPP is Pe-
ter Vitousek, Paul & Anne Ehrlich and Pamela Matson’s
“Human Appropriation of the Products of Photosynthe-
sis” from 1986 (Vitousek et al., 1986). The authors distin-
guish between three calculations leading to a low, an in-
termediate and a high estimate, respectively. In the low es-
timate, only the directly used organic material (food, fuel,
clothing, timber, etc.) is included. This amounts to 3% of
total NPP. The intermediate estimate includes the produc-
tivity of land that is now devoted entirely to human activ-
ity, but which could be used otherwise. This estimate lies
somewhere between 30 and 40% of the terrestrial NPP.
The highest estimate moreover includes productive ca-
pacity lost as a result of converting open land to cities and
forests to pastures and losses due to desertification and
overuse. The result lies above 40% of terrestrial NPP, and
the authors furthermore underline that humans influence
the rest significantly. These results have later been up-
dated several times with fairly similar results (Vitousek et
al., 1997; Rojstaczer et al., 2001).
A recent assessment, based on both satellite and statis-
tical data, concluded that in 1995, humans were appropri-
Figure 1: Human population size 0-2050 AD. Based on estimates
from U.S. Census Bureau (reproduced from http://www.census. gov
/ipc/www/worldhis.html).
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ating about one fifth of the Earth’s total NPP on land
(Imhoff et al., 2004). The reason why the new estimate
differs from previous calculations is mainly a matter of se-
mantics: some of the land uses included in earlier studies
are kept out of the new one. However, in densely popu-
lated areas like Western Europe and South Central Asia,
appropriation is still estimated to amount to 70-80% of the
regional NPP supply. Today, cultivated systems cover one
fourth of the terrestrial surface (MEA 2005). These are
also the areas which are most suited for agriculture as well
as for human living in general. The least used areas – tun-
dra areas, deserts, boreal forests, montane or dry grass-
and shrubland, tropical rainforests, etc. – are the least ac-
cessible areas, or areas that for various reasons are diffi-
cult to cultivate. However, due to population growth,
along with a number of other factors, the pressure on these
areas is increasing. This is particularly the case with the
tropical and subtropical rainforests, savannahs, grass and
shrublands (MEA 2005).
Although the human impact on the channels, through
which the material and energy of the biosphere are floating,
is truly significant, it is not altogether obvious how one
should react to it. The American philosopher Mark Sagoff
(2004) has brought attention to studies which estimate ter-
mites’direct consumption of NPP to be as a high as 30-40%
or ten times more than that of human beings. Sagoff argues
that if the human consumption is a problem due to its size,
the consumption by termites (or beetles, earthworms, ants)
must be a much greater problem. Alternatively, one must
take a theological stand and consider human beings as un-
natural creatures, tainted by original sin, who somehow de-
naturalises the flow of organic material by consuming or
maybe even just affecting it. 
Even though I find that Sagoff takes the problems of
human pressure on ecosystems too lightly, he certainly
has pointed out a tricky problem. After all, a human being
is as natural as the next living creature, and the fact that
human beings occupy and consume an increasing part of
the globe does not make it less natural. If the significant
influence of humans on the biosphere should worry us as
a true problem, at least one out of two further assertions
needs to be confirmed.
Either one has to argue convincingly that human ap-
propriation of NPP leads to less valuable processes and
products than if it were left for other species. Indications
of inevitable losses of valuable biological diversity due to
further human expansion are strong arguments in favour
of this, but these losses always have to be weighted
against the expected advantages of a further expansion in
terms of cultural surplus. Alternatively, it needs to be
shown that the current and anticipated human appropria-
tion is impossible to sustain, for instance, due to unavoid-
able degradation of land fertility. This is a very difficult
question to answer in general, because the answer very
much depends on local conditions – soil, water, climate,
ecological resilience and various social factors – as well
as on future technological possibilities for more efficient
production, particularly of food.
So let us leave the question for now, and ask instead
whether there is land enough at all for the increasing num-
ber of humans to make a living. The interesting indicator
here is the ratio of productive and arable land areas to the
numbers of humans. Mathis Wackernagel (2001) has cal-
culated – on the basis of various UN statistics – how much
space each world citizen would have at his or her disposal,
if the total of biologically productive space on the planet
were distributed evenly. The biologically productive space
is the area that produces more than 95 per cent of the bios-
phere’s biomass, including actually and potentially culti-
vated land (forests, pastures, and arable land) as well as
ecologically productive ocean areas located on continental
shelves. The land areas amount to some 1.6 hectares per
world citizen, to which may be added 0.5 hectares of pro-
ductive ocean areas. If some space should be left for other
species to live without heavy human influence, there will
be even less land areas to distribute. 
A few hectares per world citizen; this is definitely not
very much. Wackernagel’s own estimates indicate that the
average world citizen already uses 2.8 hectares, whereas
citizens of the richest countries use at least twice as much
on average. Consequently, according to Wackernagel, we
have already exceeded the biological capacity of the
globe. The expected future fifty per cent increase in world
population makes this even more obvious, particularly if
everybody is expected to reach living standards similar to
the average of today’s richest fifth. 
Wackernagel’s calculations are to some extent based
on rather shaky data and controversial assumptions. The
most controversial assumption, and the one which influ-
ences the result most significantly, being responsible for
almost half of the calculated land use, is the assumption
that the use of fossil fuels should be converted to land ar-
eas used as sinks for the extra released carbon dioxide.
The argument is that we can exceed the amount of area
available by leaving a growing amount of carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere instead of recycling it through sinks. Al-
though this argument does make sense, it can also be
somewhat misleading, particularly when estimates of fu-
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ture land use are made. One may all too easily overlook
the fact that energy consumption needs can be satisfied in
less area-demanding ways, for example by using wind
mills or solar collectors. 
Another issue of controversy is the estimates of aver-
age biological productivity in humanly managed systems.
These estimates are difficult to make even in relation to
current land use; depending on crops and agricultural
methods, estimates of productivity can vary as much as a
factor 5 from field to field, (Rojstaczer et al., 2001), and
estimates of future sustainable productivity further de-
pend on difficult assessments concerning the possibility
of technological improvements and estimates of the costs
related to a growing productivity.
Still, despite the controversies, the indicators show us
quite clearly that the human population has already
reached a size which may be difficult to sustain, especially
when the survival and well-being of other species and pop-
ulations is a concern as well (as I certainly believe it ought
to be). And, remember, there will be 50% more people
within this century. Some of the uncultivated areas, which
are now getting under pressure, are among the richest ar-
eas on the globe in terms of biodiversity, the so-called hot
spots (Pitman & Jørgensen, 2002). It is by no means un-
founded when biologists are warning against an emerging
threat of a humanly induced sixth extinction, comparable
in size to the previous five big ones, which all occurred
long time before the emergence of human beings (e.g.
Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1981; Wilson, 1992 and 2001; Leakey
& Lewin, 1996; Ceballos & Ehrlich, 2002). In this respect,
too, human activity has reached a geological scale.
The age of fossil fuels
Let us now turn to another significant large-scale change
issue: the use of fossil fuels. It is well known that the ex-
ceptional material growth, we have witnessed the latest
century and a half, to a large extent is fuelled by fossil ves-
tiges, oil in particular. This has been an extremely cheap
and extensive energy source, which has worked as a
power boost apparently emancipating the human species
from the ordinary global cycles of energy and material. 
It has been discussed for more than a century, how far
into the future the source can continue to be extracted.
Some of the most serious estimates has been made by the
geologist M. King Hubbert, who was employed by the oil
industry for a number of decades. The first of his estimates
was published in Science as early as 1949, predicting that
the age of fossil fuels will only be a very short episode in
the history of mankind. 80 per cent of the oil reserves
could be expected to be consumed within half a century
(King Hubbert, 1949). In 1956 he predicted that the peak
in oil consumption would take place around the year 2000,
after which the use of oil would decline almost as quickly
as it was established (King Hubbert, 1956). The only al-
ternative, which at that time appeared to be able to gener-
ate comparable amounts of energy, was nuclear power
(Figure 2). New estimates were made in the book Energy
and Power from 1971 (King Hubbert, 1971). In Hubbert’s
assessments of coal consumption, it was estimated that
coal consumption would not peak much later than half a
century after the oil peak, if it became the main energy
source in a world of continuous material growth – and this
is a necessity if all world citizens are expected to approach
the current consumption standards of the industrialised
part of the world.
Some recent estimates – based on King Hubbert’s own
methods – confirm the older projections to a large extent.
One of the most prominent participants in the debate, the
Irish geologist Colin J. Campbell, founder of the inde-
pendent Association for the Study of Peak Oil, has argued
that King Hubbert’s estimates were just about right and
that oil consumption is peaking right now during the first
Figure 2: The famous “Hubbert
Peak” in the short-termed Age of Fos-
sil Fuels (reproduced from M. King
Hubbert, 1956).
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couple of decades of this century, and can be expected to
decline afterwards (Figure 3). 
Others expect the peak in oil production to lie at least
half a century ahead, unless consumption growth surpasses
an average of 2 per cent p.a. (Figure 4). In 2004, though,
primary energy consumption actually increased by 4.3%.
Coal was the fastest growing fuel, rising 6.3% globally,
whereas oil consumption grew by 3.4% (BP, 2005).
The differences between these estimates are important,
of course, from the point of view of current energy plan-
ning (not to mention the perspective of our own lives), be-
cause the amount of time for adjustment will be crucial.
The reasons why such differences occur are interesting,
too, as they influence the critical assumptions behind pro-
jections of future (as yet unknown) possibilities (cf., for
instance, Illum, 2005 and Maugeri, 2004). I shall not deal
with them here, though. If we look at the projections from
within a very large-scale change perspective, the similari-
ties overshadow the differences. All estimates confirm the
fact that the age of cheap and easily accessible fossil fuels
(the most important of which is oil), must be considered a
very short incident in the history of mankind, more or less
coincident with the age of extreme population growth. 
As fossil fuels – oil, gas and coal – account for almost
90 per cent of the total (traded) primary energy consump-
tion today (BP, 2005), the continuous growth (Figure 5)
and eventual decline in consumption is alarming, indeed,
particularly when continuous growth in population and
overall consumption put still more pressure on the land
which can be used for alternative biotic energy production.
The good news is that even without the fossil fuels
there is still a sufficient amount of possibilities to collect
energy for human use. The amount of solar energy arriv-
ing on Earth is huge, compared to the energy generated
from fossil fuels and just a tiny fraction channelled
through human societies would be enough to satisfy the
needs and wants currently relying on (often: inefficient
use of) fossil fuels. It has been estimated that the theoret-
Heavy etc.
Deepwather
Figure 3: Colin J. Campbell’s
2004 estimates of oil and gas
consumption 1930-2050 (re-
produced from http://www.hub-
bertpeak.com/us/eia/oilsup-
ply2004.htm).
Figure 4: U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration’s scenarios based on var-
ious estimates from the U.S. Geologi-
cal Survey (reproduced from EIA,
2004). It is worth noticing that the as-
sumptions lead to a sudden and very
quick decline once the peak has been
reached. If no alternatives are in place
at that time, the consequences will in-
evitably be dramatic.
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ical potential for renewable energy is 2850 times the cur-
rent global use of energy (Greenpeace, 2005), and that the
part, which can be accessed by known technology, is at
least five times bigger than total energy consumption to-
day. Wind energy alone could probably provide for half of
the current energy consumption. The technological po-
tential is already developed enough to make a shift from
fossil fuels possible, as presented in several sustainable
energy plans (e.g., WBGU, 2004; Greenpeace, 2005; IN-
FORSE, 2005), and even though the use of the solar en-
ergy flow necessitates more careful planning, due to the
use of a broad complementary variety of sources with dif-
ferent qualities (Lund, 2006), lack of energy does not
have to be the main problem – unless, of course, the
global demand continues to grow at the current rate.
The bad news is that the shift is taking place so slowly
that the burning of fossil fuels may continue long enough
to cause serious climate change with unfortunate conse-
quences. Thus, the true problem in the short run may not
be scarcity, but rather abundance of fossil fuels. In the
long run, however, it will be very difficult to sustain a
global consumption ten times as big as today. A radical,
but probably also quite difficult decoupling of wealth and
energy flow is badly needed.
Climate Change
The use of fossil fuels is closely related to my last exam-
ple of large-scale transformation: climate change. Current
climate changes are linked to population growth and the
growing consumption of fossil fuels, both directly,
through the carbon dioxide emissions from the burning of
fuels (together with the clear cutting of forests), and indi-
rectly, by way of other changes to which a growing popu-
lation and an increasing use of energy have given rise.
The graph in Figure 6 is often referred to as the
“hockey stick” curve, and it resembles almost too obvi-
Figure 5: The EU-Commission’s “business as usual” reference
scenario of world energy consumption 2000-2030 (reproduced
from EU Commission 2003). The scenario is based on the assump-
tion that the gross consumption increases at 1.8 per cent per year
between 2000 and 2030. This again rely on the assumptions that
world population grows at a rate of 1 per cent per year and the per
capita GDP at 2.1 per cent per year (the developing countries’
economies are not expected to grow significantly), while the energy
intensity of GDP decreases by –1.2 per cent per year. The energy
prices are not expected to rise significantly, nor is it expected that
the resulting doubling of annual CO2 emissions (or other related
environmental problems) will have any influence neither physically
nor politically.
Figure 6: Climate change, Northern Hemisphere
1000-2000 AD. Based on estimates from Mann et al.
(1999) and IPCC (2001) (reproduced from http://
www. grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/).
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ously the similar hockey stick curves of population
growth and fossil fuel consumption. The precise form of
the curve has been a matter of controversy – other inter-
pretations try to make the changes appear less clear-cut –
and the figure itself shows clearly the uncertainties of his-
torical records. Still, there is no longer reason to doubt that
human actions have actually led to greenhouse gas emis-
sions of major climatic significance. 
Research on ice cores has shown a remarkable accor-
dance between global temperature and CO2 concentrations
(and also CH4 concentrations) in the atmosphere, and there
seems to be a clear mutual influence (Petit et al., 1999;
IPCC, 2001). Ultimately, the heavy fluctuations of both are
determined by the strongest factor of all: the periodic
changes of the precession, obliquity and eccentricity of the
Earth’s orbit. Another external factor, the changing solar ir-
radiation plays an apparently minor roll. Still, it is well
documented that both CO2 and CH4 are greenhouse gases,
and if the amounts of these grow as extensively in the at-
mosphere, as they do today, this will almost inevitably lead
to changes of temperature. Petit et al. (1999) have esti-
mated that greenhouse gases’ contributions to previous cli-
mate changes have been as high as 50 per cent.
Figure 7 below shows how extraordinary the current
increase in atmospheric CO2 concentration is, even when
measured on a geological scale. The concentration has in-
creased from around 250 to 350 ppmv within a few
decades, due to human influence. If the annual CO2 emis-
sions double before 2030, as it is assumed both in the EIA
and the EU Commission’s reference scenarios (Figures 4
and 5), it is hard to believe that the consequences will be
no more than trivial, particularly for the most exposed and
vulnerable populations, not only of human beings but of
other species as well. 
Long-term estimates of past climate changes, based on
various kinds of indicators like ice cores and tree rings, are
not as reliable as direct measurements of current changes,
of course, and they should be handled with an appropriate
amount of caution. The data often leave room for more
than one interpretation. The hockey stick image in Figure
6 may be based on sets of data that are still too uncertain,
given the broad band of uncertainty lying on both sides of
the straightforward average interpretation. Still, there does
no longer seem to be any serious disagreement about the
reality of a significant raise in human influence on climate
during the latest century due to emissions of greenhouse
gases, particularly carbon dioxide. Human beings have be-
come a factor that is measurable on a geological scale in re-
lation to climate as well as to land use. 
Thinking like a mountain
From a long-term large-scale perspective, two major
points stand out clearly. Firstly, the latest couple of cen-
turies have been unique, extreme in fact, in terms of
growth of population, energy consumption, and material
flow. Secondly, the consequences of human activities can
no longer be considered marginal even on the largest scales
relevant on Earth. Human beings have become a key fac-
tor for all kinds of life on Earth. Which kind of attitude is
appropriate, then, when dealing with these changes? 
Figure 7: Atmospheric CO2 concen-
tration from the Vostok ice core
record with the recent human pertur-
bation superimposed. The inserted
figure shows the observed increase in
atmospheric CO2 concentration 1960
-2000 from the Mauna Loa Observa-
tory on Hawaii. The figure is based
on data from Petit et al. (1999), and
the U.S. National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA)
(reproduced from IGBP, 2001).
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One possibility is to take the scale seriously and try to
“think like a mountain,” as the American wildlife man-
ager Aldo Leopold recommended in his famous book A
Sand County Almanac (published posthumously in
1949). Leopold’s catchword emerged at the end of a story
of a wolf hunt: Game managers believed they could man-
age local ecosystems more efficiently without unpre-
dictable wolves, saving more deer for the hunters. Later
on, it turned out that the loss of the wolves just led to more
problems. Even before the last wolves were shot, Leopold
himself had doubts whether they were truly on the right
track. When finally he looked into the eyes of the last dy-
ing wolf he realised that a manager will not be able to do
the right thing until he learns to think like a mountain
(Leopold, 1949/1989).
To think like a mountain – this is undeniably an in-
triguing idea. No wonder it has caught the attention of
many people. (An internet search brought almost 15 mil-
lion references for “thinking like a mountain”!). Leopold’s
main points seem to have been the following ones. Firstly,
we need to look at current human aspirations from a
broader perspective than that of short-sighted selfishness
and avoid decision-making based on too short time scales.
Secondly, we should be aware of large-scale mechanisms
that we do not know in detail and over which we cannot
have full control. This is true of non-linear ecological sys-
tems, but may also quite often be the case in human affairs
that involve a large number of actors. Thirdly, we ought to
give due respect to the lives of non-human organisms. 
To Leopold, the metaphor of ‘mountain thinking’ sig-
nified stability and large-scale perspective as against the
short-sighted fuzziness characteristic of modern life. It
also appeared to lead to the kind of disinterested impar-
tiality appropriate in matters of ethical concern: “Only the
mountain has lived long enough to listen objectively to
the howl of a wolf” (Leopold, 1949/1989). Although
Leopold used the vast scale metaphor of thinking like a
mountain, his concerns were still fairly limited. He was
employed as game manager, when the culling of wolves
took place, and even though he became patron of wildlife
in general, or of “land the collective organism,” and ad-
vocated a change of attitudes from “man the conqueror”
to “man the biotic citizen” (Leopold, 1949/1989), his
main concern was the preservation of wilderness areas,
where wolves and “the land” in general could thrive with-
out inappropriate interference from humans. 
At first glance, the challenges we are facing today
seem to appeal even more to mountainous thinking, being
truly large-scale and likely to influence life on earth as far
ahead as we are able to envisage. On the face of it, moun-
tain thinking seems particularly suited for such cases. On
the other hand, mountain thinking, taken literally, may
easily turn out to be way too distanced from the issues that
we find truly important in ethics. After all, human inter-
ests and concerns may appear to be too insignificant to
matter much. From a mountainous point of view, there is
no difference between changes due to human conduct and
other geological or biological occurrences. The impartial
mountain would probably not care much whether it is cov-
ered with bacteria or with sensitive creatures like wolves
and human beings. Even if we accept Leopold’s claim that
the summum bonum from a mountainous point of view is
simply to “preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of
the biotic community” (Leopold, 1949/1989), it would not
matter whether human beings continued to be part of this.
From a human point of view, however, it matters quite a
lot. 
In the tradition of landscape aesthetics, mountains
have been associated with the concept of the ‘sublime,’
which occurred as a response to the idea of a decentred in-
finite universe occurring in the 17th century (Nicolson,
1959/1997). Mountains appeared vast and majestic, al-
most like the starry sky; at the same time frightening and
yet fascinating, even attracting due to their enormous size
and the large time scale perspective they represent. They
were “incomprehensible for our imagination” as the Ger-
man philosopher Immanuel Kant (1790/1974) pointed out
in his analysis of the sublime ,and their scales appeared in
all dimensions to be so much out of line with those of the
individual human being that they made his or her ambi-
tions and efforts seem hopelessly vain and inadequate. To
think like mountains meant thinking in terms of the infi-
nite, sub specie aeternitatis; an important corrective to
pettiness, like the mountaineer leaving all the tiny affairs
of everyday life behind, but also a memento mori, a scary
reminder of our own finiteness. 
Thinking like a tradesman
”In the long run we are all dead.” This could be the ulti-
mate point of sublime mountain thinking. It is also one of
the most quoted sentences among economists, however.
John Maynard Keynes is the originator, using it in a cri-
tique of Alfred Marshall’s distinction between what
counts in the short run, where the neoclassical marginalist
concept of value is appropriate, and the long run, where
the classical concept of “natural” value may happen to be
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correct (Marshall, 1920). Keynes’ point was that we know
(and care) too little about what will happen in the long run
to be able to make use of the distinction in a meaningful
way. A fortunate thing, he argued, because at least so far
we have seen society continue to prosper exactly due to
the fact that everybody pursues short-sighted marginal
gains without too many thoughts about the long run and
“natural” value. 
But how about the disturbing trends summarized in the
figures above? From the camp of neoclassical economists,
we receive the standard answer that these trends need not
worry us. Two arguments are typically employed in uni-
son. Firstly, as long as we desist interfering with the mar-
ket, its mechanisms will continue to keep us on the right
track. If one kind of resource runs out, or rather, becomes
too expensive to be exploited with revenue, the short-
sighted gain seekers will turn to something else. Secondly,
humans are basically creative beings, open-minded and
prepared for changes. They will always be capable of
finding new possibilities, or more efficient ways of using
older ones. The resource basis will not diminish, but can
be expected to expand along with the developing capabil-
ities following from progress in scientific and technologi-
cal knowledge. In fact, the economists argue, the basic re-
source is knowledge itself, not material resources. Conse-
quently, Neo-Malthusians are wrong. 
The second point – that we should not forget techno-
logical, scientific and social innovation – is sound and
very important not to ignore. Still, there are several rea-
sons why the standard answer in total is not acceptable
without further ado. Let me just mention a few of these
here (for further discussion and references, see Arler
2006). Firstly, leaving it all to the market may not be such
a good idea, as long as the market is infected with sys-
tematic failures. Many costs and benefits are not valued
on the market at all, environmental costs being the key ex-
ample, and future costs are not valued on current markets,
although, in theory, they should be. In order to make the
market work in a way that matches the suppositions in
economic theory, the standard answer from neoclassical
economists is to let these issues be incorporated into the
current market by use of cost-benefit analysis. 
Cost-benefit analyses of large-scale changes like the
increasing greenhouse effect tend to confirm the conclu-
sion that there is no need for radical measures in order to
cope with them. There is one simple reason for this, how-
ever: future impacts are discounted at the current rate of
interest for reasonably safe investments, i.e. by some 5-
10% p.a. This is based, primarily, on the assumption that
technological improvement and economic growth in gen-
eral will continue in a business-as-usual sort of way. The
use of a high discount rate has the consequence that future
impacts become negligible. This is true for future losses of
human lives as well, so even if the Neo-Malthusians hap-
pen to be right, it needs not matter much, as long as the
losses take place far enough into the future.
Another point, which makes the standard answer prob-
lematic, is the probability that costs and benefits of wide-
ranging changes, like the increasing greenhouse effect or
the exploitation of the fossil fuels reserves, are separated
both in time and space. The gainers and the losers are
likely to be different people living in different places at
different times. Calculations of changes that are interna-
tional by nature involve estimates concerning people that
live under highly unequal circumstances. When differen-
tiated prices on so-called “statistical lives” are included,
anticipated losses of poor people’s lives have little signif-
icance compared to rich consumers’ requests. The high
expectations of economic growth and the corresponding
use of a high discount rate strengthen this problem, as an-
ticipated losses of future poor people’s lives disappear to-
tally from the account. But why should current rich peo-
ple’s marginal preferences count many times more than
the needs or even lives of future poor people? 
Or, to put the point in a more general form: why should
private preferences count at all, at the expense of political
values and priorities (Sagoff, 2004)? Reliance on market
mechanisms is typically legitimised by reference to the
consumers’ autonomy and freedom of choice, the notori-
ous difficulty of centralist planning, their efficiency in
terms of coordination of diversified societies, and maybe
the innovative force of a competitive setting. Even though
some of these arguments do have a certain strength – al-
beit not without reservations (cf. O’Neill, 1998) – they
loose their reliability in relation to cost-benefit analysis,
which is used exactly as a centralist planning devise in re-
lation to comprehensive long-term changes. 
Cost-benefit analyses is certainly helpful in relation to
limited projects with a marginal impact, but they are not
appropriate for assessments of comprehensive, non-mar-
ginal, international, and long-term  changes. Not only is it
extremely difficult to anticipate long-term  changes in de-
tail. This is true for all sciences dealing with the future.
Cost-benefit analysis suffers from the additional problem
that their basic data, the value relations, change along with
other changes, particularly when alterations are as wide-
ranging as those depicted in the previous section. Private
valuations made under current circumstances are all the
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analysts have. 
To this can be added that cost-benefit analysis indi-
rectly recommends a transfer of the decision-making
agency from the collective of citizens to an aggregation of
(current) consumers. Even if the market actually worked
as smoothly as it is assumed in cost-benefit analysis, and
it certainly does not, this would still not be the right basis
for making political decisions. It is a conceptual mistake
to confuse consumer preferences with values and assump-
tions related to the long-term good of society at large.
Finally, standard cost-benefit analysis is completely
incapable of dealing with the fundamental questions of
equity. The ignorance of questions of equity is usually de-
fended with the argument that if society becomes richer,
everybody is likely to gain. This argument looses its cred-
ibility, however, when benefits and costs are radically
separated in time and space, and, consequently, no com-
pensatory mechanisms are likely to be operational.
The development of the latest couple of centuries
must be considered extreme, if looked upon from a large-
scale perspective encompassing hundreds of years. More
than any other group, economists have brought attention
to a truly difficult question. Are the basic features, which
have made this extremity possible, just temporary phe-
nomena, like the immediate accessibility of cheap fossil
fuels and minerals, uncultivated land and productive
ecosystems? Or are the basic forces irreversible and per-
manent features like the market system and a scientific
and technological culture, which, once reached, can be ex-
pected to continue to develop without limits? Neoclassical
economic theorists typically opt for the second option and
tend to see the current situation as continuously normal.
20th century growth is therefore expected to continue as
far into the future as it will ever be necessary to take into
account. As attractive as this assumption may seem, it is
also extremely risky to rely on in relation to specific deci-
sion-making, particularly when it is unrelated to any em-
pirical foundation. 
Thinking as a citizen
Mountain thinking is too sublime, economics too short-
sighted. The question is whether it is possible to find some
middle course between the two, without losing any of the
good points, which can be found in both. I believe there is,
and that the perspective we are looking for must be con-
structed along the lines of a kind of theory, which the
American philosopher Peter Wenz has named the Concen-
tric Circle Theory (Wenz, 1988). Let me explain some of
the merits of this kind of theory on the basis of Figure 8. 
We are all involved in various kinds of relationships.
Figure 8: Three dimensions where ob-
ligations may become relevant. The
closer to the centre a group is placed,
the stronger and more comprehensive
will the obligations usually be, accord-
ing to Concentric Circle Theories (re-
produced from Arler, 2001).
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Some are close, like family and close friendships; others
are far more remote, like common membership of the EU,
whereas others are still so vague that we seldom think of
them, like the common membership of the Earth’s 4.5 bil-
lion year old biotic community. To be involved in rela-
tionships is binding; the closer and more comprehensive a
relationship is, the more binding and numerous will our
obligations be. If my own child is hungry and incapable of
finding food on her own, I am strongly committed to help
her. If a child in a foreign country is hungry, I rely on the
hope that she has some relatives to take care of her. If she
is the victim of some unfortunate circumstances, I will
consider contributing money through a helping organisa-
tion. If the cub of a fox in a remote country is hungry, I
hope the best for it (if I know anything about it at all), but
I feel no commitment to get involved, unless, perhaps, the
fox is one of the last few survivors of a species threatened
by extensive hunting.
I tend to believe that most other people agree. We care
more about those of our fellow biotic citizens who are
closest to us for some reason. It is not quite as simple as
illustrated in Figure 8. I may, for instance, have colleagues
on the other side of the globe that I regard as closer to me
than my neighbour. Differences in obligation are caused
by various factors. Location does matter, of course, be-
cause physical nearness makes it easier to become ac-
quainted, and presumably, my neighbour pays taxes to the
same authorities as I do and is associated with the same
community and nation. Mutual knowledge about needs
and wishes, mutual impact, mutual agreement about val-
ues and goals, common projects, etc., are all elements that
matter.
However, even though our attention is mainly focused
on those who are closest to us, and towards whom our ob-
ligations are more comprehensive, the obligations emerg-
ing from the larger circles are in a certain sense stronger
than those that emerge from the smaller circles. Or, to put
it in another way, the orders of the larger circles determine
the orders of the smaller ones. This can be illustrated by a
couple of examples. If international relations are in a state
of war and chaos, this will inevitably do a lot of damage
to the national order. A reasonable international order
needs to be established, in order for the national society to
be well-functioning. So even though I am more concerned
about people within my own country, re-establishing the
international order will have first priority. 
Or take another example: let us assume that my cousin
is employed in the local tax department, and that she is
very considerate about people within her family circle.
Does this commit her, or at least allow her, to let them off
paying taxes? Certainly not; in a well-ordered society there
is no room for nepotism, corruption, or fraud. In this case
the societal obligations are stronger than family duties. 
This is not simply a weighing of family benefits
against the possible costs: she may get into trouble if her
fraud is discovered, and the family may suffer if nepotism
becomes a social canon. The argument goes deeper. Basi-
cally, I assume that we must be able to justify our conduct
on the basis of impartial reasons that we expect every-
body, who is capable of reasoning, to be willing to accept
(cf. also Kant, 1980; Wellmer, 1986; Scanlon, 1998).
When I take special care of my family, for instance, I ex-
pect everybody else to do the same. My first-order par-
tiality towards my own family ought to be acceptable on
the basis of second-order impartiality rules, leaving every-
body else with a similar allowance (Barry, 1995). How-
ever, if my care is so extensive that I neglect common
rules, I can no longer expect everybody else to accept my
actions (apart from certain cases of emergency). The ar-
gument is not even that I, or my family, will be better off
in a well-ordered society without fraud and nepotism; in
that case we may try to transport all costs of current activ-
ities to be dealt with by future generations. If I find it im-
portant to be able to justify my conduct with reasons, I be-
lieve everybody, including future people, ought to accept
that, this is no longer an option.
Which kinds of obligations are relevant, then? In rela-
tion to future generations, the arguments must be similar
to those we use in current large circle relations. Even
though commitments are more comprehensive towards
our closest co-existing relatives, we are only allowed to
fulfil these commitments in ways that are acceptable
within the larger circle of intergenerational obligations. I
have proposed elsewhere (e.g., Arler, 2001a) that the ob-
ligations towards future generations be comprised into
three basic principles. Firstly, each generation should
leave succeeding generations resources and environmen-
tal circumstances which can be expected to be as good as
those they themselves inherited. This principle is similar
to the Lockean proviso. Secondly, deterioration of envi-
ronmental goods, depletion of resources, and increasing
risks should, if possible, be compensated by improved op-
portunities like, for instance, added wealth, knowledge,
technology, etc. This is not always possible, because some
resources are critical or unique, and cannot be substituted
for (Arler, 2005 & 2006; Leist, 2005). These resources
should be preserved, if possible, in any case. Thirdly, no
single group (or generation) should be sacrificed for the
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good of the wealth and welfare of others. These three
principles are open for various interpretations, of course,
but this is unavoidable in any case.
How about obligations across national borders? Since
the end of the Second World War, the organising of inter-
national relations has pursued the neighbourhood ideal
codified in the UN Charter. This ideal includes a sharp
line between national and international affairs. The coun-
try is sovereign in relation to internal regulations, wealth
and welfare of its citizens, cultural priorities, etc. Corner-
stone principles are freedom and independence for every
people, duty of compliance with international agree-
ments, mutual respect and equality as contract partners,
duty of non-intervention, right of self-defence, and duty
to aid burdened societies (Commission on Global Gover-
nance, 1995; Rawls, 1999). In general, this is a reasonable
ideal in the present situation, and it fits in well with Con-
centric Circle Theories.
At the Earth Summit in Rio 1992, a new important
concept in international regulations was introduced,
which takes us a bit beyond the neighbourhood ideal.
Some issues, global challenges like the increasing green-
house effect and the increasing losses of biodiversity,
were depicted as ‘common concerns of humankind’ that
should be dealt with in accordance with basic principles
of equity and social justice. In the Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, for instance, it is emphasized
that obligations must be differentiated and “specific
needs and special circumstances” of vulnerable countries
taken into consideration. This is confirmed in the UN
Millennium Declaration, which states that global chal-
lenges must be managed in a way that “distributes the
costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic princi-
ples of equity and social justice” (UN 2000, Article I.6).
I have argued elsewhere (Arler, 2001b) that the basic
ideals behind international agreements on global chal-
lenges ought to be complex equality and equal respect (cf.
Walzer, 1985; Miller, 1995). Complex equality means
that justice cannot be based on just one master good, one
common nominator, one distributive criterion, one dis-
tributor, or one procedure. There are simply too many dif-
ferent kinds of goods: love, friendship, health, strength,
wealth, political influence, beauty, offices, honour, etc.
Not only are these goods too different to be distributed the
very same way; different people also pursue different
combinations. Justice demands that procedures, criteria
etc. be adjusted to the specific goods at hand. In cases
where more than one distributive solution is possible, as
is the case with regulations of the increasing greenhouse
effect, the guiding ideal should be to promote equal re-
spect for all world citizens despite their differences. An
easily understandable rule, which complies with this
ideal, would be to distribute tradable emission quotas to
countries on the basis of population size; but there are sev-
eral other reasonable solutions. The specific solutions
should, in principle, be settled in international agree-
ments, which are developed through procedures based on
principles resembling the ideals of discourse ethics as far
as possible (Habermas, 1981), even though these ideals
may be difficult even to resemble in a world which is ex-
tremely diversified in social and economic terms. 
The need for more binding international agreements in
these areas is obvious. But what if the actual procedures
are too far from ideal to be relied on, and equitable inter-
national agreements are impossible to reach? In this case,
there seems to be two roads to take. The first road is to rely
on the Kantian categorical imperative: act in accordance
with a rule, which you would find reasonable for all to fol-
low (Kant, 1965; Rose, 1992). If, for instance, you believe
that it is important that fossil fuels are faced out before the
mid-century, and that everybody, as a general rule, ought
to act in accordance with this, you should follow this rule
yourself. This rule can be applied to countries as well as to
individuals. 
A second road to take is to rely on a principle which
Wenz has called the Principle of Anticipatory Coopera-
tion: act in a way which is somewhat better than that of
people that are similar to you in relevant respects (Wenz,
1988). The point is that it does not seem reasonable to pre-
scribe very strict rules to people with strong moral com-
mitments, if this means that they are likely to come out
much worse than less committed people. This principle
can also be applied to both countries and individuals.
The two rules may actually end up the same place with
fairly similar results, because the categorical imperative
must not necessarily be interpreted in the strictest possible
manner, where actions of other people become irrelevant.
The recommended general rule, which everybody ought
to follow in the example above, may just as well turn out
to be something like this: act in a way that reduces the use
of fossil fuels as quickly as possible without making your
own living condition significantly worse than that of peo-
ple similar to you in all relevant respects. Both of the rules
leave us with a number of voids to fill out by interpreta-
tion: How strongly are we committed by the needs of fu-
ture generations? How much better do I feel obliged to
act? Who should I compare myself with? Etc. These are
obvious issues for public discourse. Still, the basic point is
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that there is little sense in demands for extreme sacrifices
from a morally committed minority, particularly not as
long as there are solutions to be found which do not de-
mand such sacrifices. However, if business just continues
as usual, equitable solutions may become less and less
easy to find.
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